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On Identifying the Remains of Deceased Clauses 
The verb want occurs followed by a variety of material: 
(l) a. Max wants Shirley to kiss him. 
b. Max wants to eat a banana. 
c. Max wants a lollipop. 
lames D. McCawley 
(University of Chicago) 
Numerous transformational grammarians have argued that sentences of the forms (la) and 
Ob) involve the same kind of underlying structure, namely one in which want has a 
sentence object, and differ only as regards whether the subject of the embedded sentence is 
deleted. Specifically, a rule of Equi-NP-deletion is posited, which deletes the subject of the 







eat a ban.an~ 
I will argue below that sentence of the form (lc) also have an underlying structure in 
which want has a sentential object, and that the surface object of want in (lc) is in fact 
the residue of an embedded clause_ I will be concerned first with demonstration that there 
IS an underlying embedded clause in sentences like (lc), and then with determining exactly 
what that clause is. There is in fact a fairly obvious analysis of (lc) in which want has a 
sentential object, namely that in which it has the same underlying structure as Max wants 
to have a lollipop and undergoes not only Equi-NP-deletion but also deletion of the verb of 
the embedded clause, and it is in fact that analysis (or at least, something very close to 
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it) which I will be presenting justification for. 
The first argument that the surface object in sentences like (lc) I S the residue of an 
embedded clause has to do with time adverbs. The time adverbs in 
{
until June. 
(2) Bill wants your apartment for 6 months . 
while you're in Botswana. 
do not give the time when the wanting takes place, as is especially clear when one consi-
ders sentences such as 
(3) Right now Bill wants your apartment until June, but tomorrow he' ll probably want 
it until October. 
Jl1 which there is another time adverb which explicity indicates another time as the time 
when the wanting takes place. If an embedded clause such as Bill have your apartment IS 
posited, that clause can serve as the scope of the time adverb (i .e. in (2), until June IS 
not the time when Bill ' s wanting takes place but the time when Bill is to have your 
apartment if his wish is to be satisfied) . Without such an embedded clause, there is nothing 
that the time adverbs can plausibly be taken as modifying. 
T wo other arguments are closely related to this one. First, positing an underlying 
sentence object with want allows a ready explanation of why clauses with want can have 
two time adverbs, as contrasted with verbs such as paint, for which such an analysis would 
be senseless and which allow only one time adverb: 
(4) a. A week ago Bill wanted your car yesterday. 
b. * A week ago Bill painted your car yesterday . 
Secondly, the hypothesis allows one to explain which of the two time adverbs controls the 
tense of want. In simple sentences, yestel'day allows past tense but not future tense, and 
tomor7'OW allows future tense but not past tense: 
(5) a. *Yesterday I played 10 Scarlatti sonatas. 
a'. Yesterday I'll play 10 Scarlatti sonatas. 
b. Tomorrow I' ll play 10 Scarlatti sonatas. 
b'. l(Tomorrow I played 10 Scarlatti sonatas. 
In the following sentence!, the tense is determined by yesterday , not by tomorrow: 
(6) a. Yesterday Bill wanted your bicycle tomorrow. 
b. ,x'Yesterday Bill will want yo ur bicycle tomorrow. 
J This example wa~ broul$'ht to my attention by Ma~aru Kajit<\. 
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· If want in fact has a sentence object, the only coherent interpretation of the adverbs in 
(6 a) is that in which yesterday modifies the main clause and tomorrow the embedded clause. 
Each time adverb controls the tense of the clause that it modifies, and thus yesterday rather 
· than tomorrow controls the tense of want in (6 a). The hypothesis that Cl c) arises through 
, deletion from a structure with a sentence object thus gives one a way of predicting when 
, tomorrow can co-occur with a past tense verb. 
The nex t argument is based on facts that are more within the domain of logic than of 
· what is usually regarded as grammar. The sentence Max wanted a lollipop is ambiguous 
between a 'referential' sense which implies that there is a lollipop such that Max wanted 
'it, and a 'non-referential ' sense which does not imply that. The referential sense has to 
, do with a desire to have aspecific lollipop: having that specific ' lollipop will satisfy Max's 
, desire and having any other lollipop will not suffice to satisfy it . The non-referential sense 
has to do with a desire that will be satisfied when Max has a lollipop, regardless of the 
identity of the lollipop. QuineCl960: 154- 6) , discussing examples such as Ernest is looking 
. for a lion, observed that that apparently simple sentence displays the same ambiguity as 
does the complex sentence Ernest is trying to find a lion and that the logical properties of 
the former can be accounted for in a natural way if one analyzes it as having the same 
logical structure as the latter. Specifically, let us assume that logicians are correct in 
representing the content of a simple sentence such as Sam kicked a dog by factoring out a 
, quantifier and an associated noun: 
(7) (Some x : x is a dog) (Sam kicked x) 
. which may be recast in tree form as 
n=s s / ' -~ ...... =--------




Sam kick ed x 
' When applied to a complex sentence such as Ernest tried to find a lion, this factorization 
, could take place on either the main or the subordinate clause, yielding the following two 
structures (Sa) and (Sb). (Sa) is a natural way to represent the referential interpretation 
,and (Sb) the non-referential interpretation, ' since in each case the complement of try 
, correctly matches the conditions for success of the attempt, and only (S a) implies the 
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as representing the logical structure of the two senses of Ernest is trying to find a lion (and " 
also of the two senses of Ernest is looking for a lion). Note, however, that Quine's mode -
of representing the content of the non-referential interpretation is possible only if there 
is an embedded clause to serve as the scope of the quantifier. Thus, positing an underlying 
sentential object in (lc) allows one in a natural way to represent its nonreferential inter-
pretation and correctly predicts that Max wanted a lollipop allows a non-referential · 
interpretation but Max ate a lollipop, in which it would be absured to posit a sentential 
object, does not. 2 
The last argument had to do with whether a quantifier applied to the main clause or -
the hypothesized subordinate clause, and the first group of arguments had to do with . 
whether an adverb applies to the main clause or the hypothesized subordinate clause. A 
sImilar argument can be made having to do with con joining . If want in fact has a sentential . 
object in (lc), then there is nothing in principle to prevent both of the structures . 
(9a) and (9b) from bejng realized as Max wants a cup and a saucer. 
In (9a) , both SI and S2 would undergo Equi-NP-deletion and deletion of have and then So " 
would undergo conjunction reduction; in (9 b), SI would undergo conjunction reduction, 
yielding Max have a cup and a saucer, and then So would be of the appropriate form to · 
undergo Equi-NP-deletion and deletion of have. Ma:c wants a cup and a saucer is in fact 
ambiguous between a sense that fits (9 a) and one that fits (9 b) : in the one case it refers . 
to two independent desires, one for a cup and one for a saucer, and in the other case it 
2 It is far from clear that ALL non-referential NP's can be taken as originating in subordinate clauses_ .. 
Such an analysis is particularly hard to justify in such cases as John imagined a polar bear. which l 
Richard Montague indeed took as reason for rejecting Quine's account of non-referential NP's. 
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(9) a. b. 
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saucer have a cup have a saucer 
refers to a single desire which is satisfied by Max's having both a cup and a saucer3. The 
same is true of conjunction with or: Max wants a Cadillac or a Volkswagen is ambiguous 
between a sense that implies that either he wants a CadilIac or he wants a V olkswagen 
(parallel to (9 a)) and a sense that refers to a single desire which will be satisfied when 
he has either a Cad ilIac or a Volkswagen (parallel to (9 b)). Not only does the hypothetical 
subordinate clause provide a natural way of distinguishing between these two interpreta-
tions, but it also allows one to maintain the otherwise valid generalization that constituents 
conjoined with or always arise through conjunction reduction from conjoined sentences'. 
Unless want has an underlying sentence object, there is no way in which a Cadillac or a 
. . 
Volkswagen could be derived by conjunction reduction in the sense which refers to a single 
desire, since that sense does not mean the same as Max wants a Cadillac or he wants a 
Volkswagen. 
The next argument has to do with the pronoun-antecedent relation. At first glance, the 
antecedent of it in OOa) appears to be a horse; however, if the antecedent were a horse, 
then replacement of a horse by something of a different gender or number ought to give 
rise to a different pronoun, though in fact it does not: 
(0) a. loe wants a horse, but his mother won't allow it. 
b. loe wants some horses, but his mother won't allow it/*them. 
c. loe wants a wife, but his mother won't allow it/*her. 
3 Kenny (1963: 122) observes that these two senses correspond to quite different states of affairs_ 
• See McCawley (1972) for arguments in support of this claim. 
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In addi tion, if the antecedent of it were a horse, then it ought to be possible to use allow 
with an object that refers to a horse; however, allow requires a sentential object: 
{ 
*Dobbin. 
(1) Joe's mother won't allow *that horse. 
Joe to have a horse. 
All of these facts are explained if want is taken as having an underlying sentence object: 
the antecedent of it in ( 0) can then be taken to be the sentence Joe have a horse, the 
pronoun will be it, since sentences count as neuter singular, and allow will not require 
anything other than the kind of object that it usually takes. 
A further fact about pronominalization also supports the analysis with a sentential object, 
namely that the following sentence is interpreted as having a referential object if the 
pronoun is them and a non-referential object if the pronoun is thats: 
(12) Bill wants a Cadillac and a Vokswagen, and hi s g irl- friend wants them/that too. 
That can serve as the pronominal form of a sen tence, but them cannot. Them would have 
to refer to the Cadillac and the Volkswagen, which it could do only if the quantifier(s) 
binding Cadillac aud Volkswagen has/have the whole sentence as scope, in which case a 
Cadillac and a Volkswagen have a referential interpretation. 
I will hencefor th take it as established that want has a sentential object in sentences like 
Max wants a lollipop and turn to the question of exactly what the deleted verb is. The 
question divides into a number of subsidiary questions: ( i) Is there one specific verb that 
has been deleted, or can any of several verbs be deleted, i.e. can sentences with want be 
ambiguous as to what verb has been deleted? (ii) Is a word of English deleted, or is some 
semantic material deleted ? This latter question has to be asked if one accepts the framework 
that I currently do, in which a grammar is a single system of rules that relate semantic 
structures to surface structures via intermediate stages. The grammar includes not only 
deletion rules, movement rules, and copying rules, but also rules that combine semantic 
units into complex units, and lexical insertion rules, which associate morphemes of the 
specific language to complexes of semantic material. Since there is no reason to expect that 
the lexical insertion rules will apply before all deletion rules (nor that they will apply 
after all deletion rules) , it cannot be assumed from the outset either that a word of 
English is deleted or that semantic material is deleted . 
The following sentences appear to be ambiguous as to what has been deleted: 
6 This argument is due to Judith N. Levi. 
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(13) a. I want more money than Sam has. 
b. Bill wants six children. 
c. Sam wants a million dollars. 
These sentences allow semantically distinct paraphrases involving have and get. This is 
perhaps clearest in the case of ( l3c) . Assume that Sam currently has $900,000. The sense 
paraphraseable as Sam wants to have a million dollars implies that Sam's desire will be satisfied 
if he increases his present wealth by $100,000; the sense paraphraseable as Sam wants to 
get a million dollars implies that Sam's desire will not be satisfied unless he gets a million 
dollars over and above the $ 900, 000 that he already has. This is a real ambiguity, since 
the distinction between the two senses is respected by rules of grammar; for example, 
(14) Sam wants a million dollars, and so does Bert. 
is appropriate in the case where each of them wants to have a million dollars or in the 
case where each of them wants to get a million dollars over and above what he presently 
has, but not in the case where one of them wants to have a million dollars and the other 
wants to get a million dollars. 
The secon'd question raises a more general question: how could you tell whether lexical 
material or semantic material has been deleted? I have been able to think of only one way 
of determining which kind of material is deleted: to look at cases where words and 
meanings do not match neatly (e .g. idiomatic uses of a word, or cases where a word that 
normally may express the meaning in question is not allowed) and see whether it is the 
word or the meaning that determines whether deletion may take place. For example, one 
could argue that the word have is deleted by showing that to every sentence of the form 
Max wants to have X, no matter how idiomatic the combination have X is, there is a 
sentence Max wants X which expresses the same meaning. Or one could argue that semantic 
material meaning 'possess' is deleted by showing that a sentence Max wants to F X has an 
equivalent Max wants X if and only if 'V' expresses the notion 'possess' but that no one 
verb with that meaning was appropriate in all examples. On the basis of a not very thorough 
tabulation of sentence with want, I have concluded that in one class of sentences the 
English verb have is deleted and in another class semantic material meaning 'obtain' is 
deleted. The following sentences illustrate idiomatic uses of have from which have has 
been deleted: 
(15) I don' t want a heart attack. 
I just want a good time. 
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I want a word with you. 
1 want sweetbreads for dinner tonight. 
Have in have a heart attack, have a good time, have a word with X, and have X for dinner 
does 110t express the notion of possesion but rather a variety of meanings that do not 
appear to be subsumable under one semantic generalization. Not quite all sentence of the 
form Max wants to have X allow deletion of have for example, corresponding to the idioms 
have a ball and , have it out with there are no such sentences as 
(16) *1 want a ball. 
*1 want it out with Fred. 
However, such cases appear to be rare enough that one can maintain that, subject to a few 
exceptions, all sentences of the form X wants to have Y allow deletion of the word have, 
not of some corresponding semantic material. The following sentences indicate that it is 
not always have that is deleted: 
(17) 1 want $10 from you by Friday. 
Fabian wanted advice from me. 
The boss wanted some originality from his employees. 
1 want $ 50, 000 a year. 
To many speakers, all of these sentences sound somewhat awkward if have is supplied, 
though there is no awkwardness with get or such synonyms of it as receive or obtain: 
(18) 1 want to get/?have $10 from you by Friday. 
Fabian wanted to get/?have advice from me. 
The boss wanted to get/?have some originality from his employees. 
I want to get/?have $ 50,000 a year. 
While each of the have sentences is felt to be perfectly acceptable by quite a lot of 
speakers, the existence of significant numbers of speakers who find them distinctly odd is 
enough to show that the acceptability of sentences with have does not fully parallel the 
acceptability of sentences with a deleted verb. Moreover, what is deleted in sentences like 
(17) can only be characterized semantically, not lexically, since idiomatic and 'non-basic' 
senses of get and receive cannot be deleted: 
(19) I want to get up at 10:00. 
I want to get elected treasurer. 
I want to receive Warsaw on my radio. 
(20) *1 want up at 10:00. 
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*I want elected treasurer. 
*1 want Warsaw on my radio. 
3:.It is hardly a pleasing result that in one class of cases a word is deleted and m others 
: semantic material is deleted; however, no other result seems to fit the facts6• 
So far I have talked only about the verb want. There are many other verbs which 
: sometimes take an infinitive object and sometimes a 'simple' object, and it is generally 
: possible to give the same kinds of arguments as in the case of waut that the 'simple' object 
:results from deleting material from an underlying sentential object. Such verbs include 
.p7'omise, offer, ask for, and hope for. For example, Fred asked Sam for a cigar or a cigarette 
has the same ambiguity as does Max wants a Cadillac or a Volkswagen, and an embedded 
·clause is necessary to represent the sense which implies that Fred asked that Sam either 
:give him a cigar or give him a cirgarette. However, the details of the deletion vary from 
-verb to verb. With promise, Equi-NP-deletion is contingent on identity with the subject, 
i.e. Max promised Shirley to wash the dishes refers to Max's washing the dishes, not to 
Shirley 's washing them. However, if 
(21) Max promised Shirley a Cadillac 
-involved Equi-NP-deletion plus deletion of have, it ought to mean that Max promised 
'Shirley that HE would have a Cadillac, whereas it actually means that he promised her that 
.-SHE would have one. Thus, either (21) involves Equi-NP-deletioll that is controlled by a 
NP other than that which normally controls it, or it involves deletion not of have, but of, 
.say, give plus its indirect object (i.e. it would be derived from Max promised Shirley to give 
. her a Cadillac). 
I will conclude this paper by pointing out that the kinds of arguments that I gave 
. above for the existence of an underlying subordinate clause are applicable not only to the 
relatively inoccuous cases where a subordinate clause loses its identity through an optional 
.. deleton of its verb, but also to cases that must be analyzed not in terms of deletion but in 
,terms of the incorporation of material into the meaning of a semantically complex verb. 
6 It will undoubtedly be of interest to investigate how this state of affairs came about. Since want 
originally meant 'lack' , i.e. 'not possess', English quite likely went through a stage in which X 
.wants Y meant 'X wants to have (=possess)Y'. If that is the case, then it appears that the dlder 
deletion rule has been generalized in two ways: by being allowed to cover not only 'possess' but 
.also 'come to possess' and by being allowed to cover uses of have which do not express its core 
meaning of 'possess'. I would be interested in finding out whether this conjectural history is correct 
_and, if so, whether the two generalizations of the deletion are independent and whether such 
.generalizations are attested in other languages. 
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Consider, for example, the following example, due to Masaru Kajita: 
(22) Yesterday Bill lent me his bicycle until tomorrow. 
The same kinds of arguments as before show that until tomorrow modifies a subordinatE' 
clause. However, (22) cannot arise through deletion of a verb, since lend does not allow a 
sentential complement: 
(23) *Yesterday Bill lent me to have his bicycle until tomorrow. 
The only plausible way to set up a subordinate clause for until tomorrow to modify is to 
decompose lend into 'allow to have' (plus additional materia l indicating e.g . that the ' 
transfer of possession is temporary) and to take until tomorrow as modifying the clause 'I 
have Bill' s bicycle' , which would be a constituent of the semar,tic structure of Bill lent me 
his bicycle. A further example of an adverb which modifies a semantic constituent of a 
word is found in Max closed the door temporarily: temporarily gives not the time that Max' s . 
action of closing the deor took place but the time that the door was to remain closed . . 
Only if Max closed the door is analyzed along the lines of Max caused (the door be closed) 7 
is there a constituent that temporarily can plausibly be taken as modifying. This involves 
taking the adjective closed as seman ticall y and syntactica ll y more basic than the transi tive 
verb close. While that may be disquieting in view of the fact that closed obviously divides 
morphologically into the verb close and an ending, it is a fact of life that morphological 
complexity does not always match syntactic and semantic complexity. Jespersen, for 
example, has observed tha t true is to truth as beautiful is to beauty, i. e. if truth is not onl y 
morphologically but also syntactically a derivative of true, then beauty is syntactically a 
derivative of beautiful, even though morphologically it is a constituent of beautiful. One fina l 
example of an adverb modifyin g part of the meaning of a word is due to Robert Binnick 
(1968) : 
(24) The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood for four years. 
This example is ambiguous as to what for four years modifies. In the less likely interpre-
tation, for four yea7'S modifies the ma in clause The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood, 
and that clause must be given an iterative interpretation : that for four years the sheriff 
kept repea tedly jailing Robin Hood, on ly to have him break out of jail. In the more likely 
interpretation, for four years gives the time that Robin Hood is to be in jail, and the verb 
jail must be decomposed into something like cause to be in jail, so as to provide a clause· 
7 I intend here the adiective closed, not the passi ve participle. 
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fer the adverb to modify (namely Robin Hood be in jail) 8. Exactly the same is true if the-
verb jail is replaced by incarcerate: The sheriff of Nottingham incarcerated Robin Hood for fOUI--
years has the same set of interpretations as does (24) and thus requires an underly.ing 
structure containing a clause that means 'Robin Hood is in jail' . The fact that the verb 
jail has a corresponding noun jail but the verb incarcerate has no corresponding noun *carccr -
thus has no bearing on how these sentences are to be analyzed. 
I will conclude by making explici t the message of this commercial: the same kinds of 
considerations which support the innocuous and relatively uncontroversial deletion of have -
in Max wants a lollipop, an analysis which is perfectly consistent - with the theory of 
Chomsky's Aspects, in which syntax and semantics are strictly segregated, also supports -
analyses like those of lend and incarcerate, in which the semantic constituents of words. 
play a signi.ficant role in syntax. It thus appears that unless one is to restrict the domain 
of syntax so that it does not include such things as modification relations, which have -
traditionall y been taken without question as within the domain of syntax, one must give 
up any boundary between syntax and semantics. 
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